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ABSTRACT
Memory corruption attacks represent one o f the largest attack classes observed in the field. Many techniques have been 
proposed to protect applications from memory corruption attacks. However, these techniques cannot be applied selectively 
to security-critical data without nullifying their guarantees. We present a technique to provide protection o f select critical 
data from a wide range o f memory corruption attacks. The technique computes the backward slice o f each critical data item 
using compiler-driven static analysis and ensures that data within the slice are not corrupted at runtime. The checking is 
performed using a combination o f hardware and software. We evaluate the technique on three real server programs and find  
that the performance overhead o f selectively protecting security critical data is about 10%.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Memory corruption attacks represent one of the largest attack classes observed in the field [36], Since languages 
such as C and C++ are not memory-safe, a pointer to a memory object can be manipulated by an attacker at 
mntime to overwrite nearby objects in memory. We define a memory cormption attack as a malicious 
modification of a pointer causing it to write to an object other than its referent object. This represents a violation 
of the intended behavior of the program, since according to the C language semantics [30], the results of a 
memory-unsafe operation are undefined.
The main contribution o f this paper is a technique for protecting critical data in a program from a wide variety 
o f memory corruption attacks using the concept o f information- flow signatures. Examples of security-critical 
data include user account data in a banking application and variables that hold information about user- 
authentication in an SSH application. While traditionally memory corruption attacks have targeted control-data in 
applications (e.g. return addresses, function pointers), it has been shown that non-control data can be just as 
easily attacked (corrupted) to gain control over programs [2],
Using compiler-based static analysis, the technique proposed in this paper extracts the backward program slice 
[25] of critical program data1 and encodes the slice in the form of a signature, referred to as the Information-flow 
signature (IFS). The signature is enforced during application execution using a combination of software and
i In this paper, we use the term data to refer to both variables as well as memory objects in the program.
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programmable hardware. Since the analysis is based on the properties of the program according to the language 
semantics, valid code is never rejected2 by the technique i.e. the technique has no false-positives.
The proposed technique is based on the well-known observation that the main reason for a memory corruption 
attack is the 'gap' between the program's source-level semantics and its execution semantics. Information flow 
signatures (IFS) en force the source-level semantics o f  memory accesses at runtime thereby closing this gap for 
critical data. The technique ensures the integrity of the protected data even if other data in the application is 
compromised or controlled by the attacker. As a result, the technique can be applied selectively to protect critical 
data in the application with significantly lower overheads compared to existing techniques for memory safety 
[3] [12] [13] which take an 'all-or-nothing' approach and are unable to provide the same guarantees when applied 
selectively to the program (as shown in section 7).
The IFS technique is implemented as a two-level checking scheme. The first level check needs to be applied for 
all instructions in the program and is therefore implemented in hardware (through processor pipeline 
modifications). The second level check needs to be applied only to those instructions that belong to the backward 
slice of critical data, which is usually a small subset of the program's instructions, and is currently implemented 
in software.
In order to reason about the guarantees provided by the IFS technique, we have built a formal model of the 
technique and have used this model to prove that the integrity of the program critical data is preserved in the face 
of memory corruption attacks. Attacks are represented as the modification of the destination of an instruction in a 
given instruction sequence to a different object (or variable) than the one specified by program semantics.
We also measured the performance overheads for runtime checking of results of information-flow signatures for 
three real server programs namely, SSH, FTP and NullHTTPd. In each case, a particular security-critical 
functionality of the application is protected. Since the technique is implemented substantially in hardware, the 
performance overhead of checking is constant and is about 10%. The software checks had negligible overhead in 
our experiments.
1.1 Threat Model
The aim of the technique is to preserve data integrity rather than its confidentiality: hence, the technique does not 
address side-channel attacks [15]. The threat model assumes that the attacker can execute arbitrary code and 
overwrite program variables stored in memory and processor registers as long as the malicious memory accesses 
are performed through the processor. Malicious DMA transfers are not covered by this threat model -- for 
example an attacker could use an IEEE 1394 interface port to initiate transfers to main memory of a system which 
are not visible to the processor [31]. We also require that the load path of the program be trusted, which can be 
accomplished through secure bootstrapping procedures [35], The technique is immune to attacks on the 
operating system after program loading is completed (as long as the attacks do not disable the hardware checker).
Examples of attacks covered in the threat model include:
• Classical memory7 corruption attacks such as buffer overflow, format string, and heap corruption attacks that 
overwrite non-control data in the application. These attacks violate the source-level semantics of the 
program and are caught by the technique. We assume that other techniques such as control-flow integrity [6] 
or program shepherding [1] can be deployed to protect control-data in the application.
• Insider attacks, in which the attacker attempts to alter (at runtime) part of the program to gain control over the 
critical data. An example of this class of attacks is a malicious plugin for a web-browser that tries to modify 
sensitive data in the browser in violation of its interface with the browser. The attack will be detected even if 
the plugin's code is unavailable at compile-time as the checks are in the browser’s source code.
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Some applications may write past the end of an object into another memory object during correct execution. We do not consider such programs.
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2. APPROACH
Memory corruption attacks are performed by causing an instruction to write to an address outside the bounds of 
the instruction's valid destination object. Therefore they can be prevented by checking the bounds of every write 
to memory. However, performing bounds checks on every write at runtime is prohibitively expensive. Static 
analysis techniques have been proposed to eliminate certain mntime checks [12] [13]. However in languages such 
as C/C++, it is very hard to statically determine the targets of memory' reads and writes and eliminate checks. 
Even with type-safe languages, one still needs to perform some checking during runtime as attacks are performed 
by distorting the behavior of instructions during program execution.
We observe that checking every write is excessive when a user is only interested in protecting certain critical 
data. The goal of our technique is to check a minimal number of instructions while ensuring that the critical data 
is not corrupted. Since we are applying protection selectively, it is insufficient to check only the direct writes to 
critical data. This is because while protecting direct writes makes it difficult for the attacker. a smart attacker 
can still influence the value o f a critical data indirectly as shown below:
Suppose program variable c is calculated by adding two other variables, a and b. Assume that c is part of the 
critical data in this application. An attacker can influence the value of c indirectly by cormpting either a or b. 
Thus, in order to protect critical data from corruption, we ensure that all data and instructions that the critical 
data is dependent upon are also protected. This constitutes the backward program slice [25] of the critical data. 
In general, the backward slice contains the set of instructions and data objects that both directly and indirectly 
influence the critical data.
The protection scheme consists of two phases: A) a compile-time phase to extract the backward slice of critical 
data in the program, and B) a runtime-phase to check if the critical data is influenced in violation of the statically 
derived backward slice. The runtime phase is implemented using a combination of software and hardware.
A. Compile-time Phase, a compiler-based static program analysis determines the following:
1) The instructions that can influence the critical data (according to program semantics)
2) For each instruction in (1), the set of objects (data) that the instruction is allowed to write to
The compiler marks each instruction in (1) and each object in (2) as trusted. This trusted property is propagated 
at mntime according to the propagation rules defined in Section 4.2.
B. Runtime Phase, The following invariants are enforced by a combination of hardware and software at mntime.
1) Critical data is modified only by trusted instmctions and objects (enforced in hardware)
2) Each trusted instruction writes only to its statically allowed objects (enforced in software)
If either property is violated, an interrupt is triggered which halts execution of the program and raises a security 
alert before critical data is corrupted. This is vital to ensure fast application recovery, from a checkpoint for 
example (we do not consider recovery techniques further in this paper).
3. STATIC PROGRAM ANALYSIS
This section describes the approach to derive information flow signatures for critical data in applications. 
Without loss of generality, we refer to critical data as critical variables in this section, although in reality critical 
data encompasses both memory objects and program variables. The steps in the compiler analysis are as follows:
1) Determining the security-critical variables for the program. This is done by the programmer using source 
code annotations, based on an understanding of the program semantics (for example, variables used in 
authenticating a user in an SSH server).
2) Constructing the backward program slice. The compiler then constmcts the backward program slice for each 
of the critical variables. This slice contains all the data and instmctions that legitimately (according to source- 
code semantics) influence the critical variable either directly or indirectly in a program execution. The
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backward slice is computed inter-procedurally in the program (the implications of this are discussed in section 
3.1).
3) Encoding the dependencies. After extracting the backward slice, the compiler stores information identifying 
the critical variables and their extracted dependencies (both instructions and data) either in a separate 
configuration file, or by embedding it in the executable. This information is configured into the hardware 
module that performs runtime checking at program load time.
3.1 Data-flow and Pointer Analysis
In order to extract the backward slice of the security critical variables, the compiler performs pointer and data­
flow analysis on the program. While data-flow analysis typically involves data dependences through registers and 
pointer analysis tracks data dependences through memory. Data-flow analysis answers the question of which 
instmctions can directly or indirectly affect certain registers, while pointer analysis answers the question of 
which instructions can potentially write to specific memory variables [32], This is done by deriving points-to 
sets of pointer variables used by the store instructions. The points-to sets of the loads and stores are then used to 
construct a conservative superset of the data flow arcs between these instructions. While register data-flow 
analysis is a standard technique in most compilers and is highly accurate, pointer analysis is a much harder 
problem and is typically addressed with various degrees of approximation depending on the space/time tradeoffs
[14].
The approximations made by the compiler generally over-estimate the memory data-flow graph, thus affecting 
the checking resolution of the derived signatures and possibly allowing attacks that could have been avoided in a 
more accurate analysis. Appendix A discusses the effects of using imprecise pointer analysis on the security of 
the IFS technique.
In order to ensure that the protection is as high as possible, we use a precise pointer analysis scheme (context-, 
field-, array- and heap-sensitive analysis according to the classification in [14] ) to compute the points-to sets o f 
instructions in the program. The effect o f flow-insensitivity is considered in the next section.
3.2 Effect of Flow-insensitivity
A flow-sensitive analysis is one which considers the order of updates to a pointer variable within a function. For 
example, consider the piece of code in Table la. In the code pointer p  initially points to the address of variable x. 
It is then updated with the address of variable y, and is finally assigned to the pointer q. A flow-sensitive analysis 
will reason (accurately) that pointer q can only point to the variable y. This is shown in Table lb. A flow- 
insensitive analysis on the other hand, will assume that both p  and q can point to either x or y, as it does not 
consider the order in which the statements are executed. This is shown in Table lc.
Table 1: Example showing the effect of flow-insensitive analysis on security
a) b) c)
p  = &x ; P <-{*} P < -{x,y}
P -  &y ; p  <-{ y } p  <-{ x, y }
q = p; p <~{y}> y } P <-{x,y} q <-{x,y}
A smart attacker could take advantage of the imprecision introduced by the flow-insensitivity and make either 
pointer p  or q point to the address of object x. This can be accomplished by changing the control-flow of the 
program, or by overwriting the value of the pointer p  (or q) through a memory error. In order to achieve useful 
results with the attack, the variable y  must belong to the backward slice of critical data in the program (so that the 
attacker can influence the critical variable). This problem can be avoided if within a single function, the same 
pointer is not used for accessing both variables that belong to the backward slice of critical data as well as 
variables that do not. Our compiler analysis performs limited single-static assignment (SSA) transformation to 
achieve partial flow-sensitivity.
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3.3 Discussion
In this section, we consider some limitations of our current compiler analysis and how discuss this affects the 
coverage of the proposed technique.
• We do not protect control-data dependences in the program. For example, if variable A is used as part of a 
branch decision in computing the value of a second variable B, B is control-data-dependent on A [32], In our 
current implementation control-data-dependences are not included in the backward slice of signatures. As a 
result certain attacks may escape detection, as shown in section 5.2.
• For some applications, it may not be possible to encode the entire backward slice starting from the critical 
variable and going back to the beginning of the program, as the slice may be too large to fit in the hardware 
module that performs runtime checking. While this was not the case in the applications considered in Section 
6, in general it may be necessary’ to constrain the number of levels up to which the backw ard slice is encoded 
by the technique. We believe that encoding the slice for even a few levels is often sufficient in practice. This is 
because in order to be undetected by the technique, an attacker must corrupt data prior to the encoding o f  the 
slice in the program. Moreover, it may be di fficult for an attacker to cause data corruption that propagates to 
the critical variable without crashing the program or resulting in failed assertions.
4. RUNTIME CHECKING
This section presents a two-level checking scheme that enforces the information flow signature and detects 
attacks memory’ corruption attacks before the critical data is corrupted. The two levels are summarized below:
• The first level ensures that only certain instructions (called trusted instructions) can write to the critical data.
• The second level ensures that trusted instructions only write to the trusted data they are allowed to write to by 
the source semantics (as determined by the static program analysis in section 3).
4.1 Terms and Definitions
Before presenting the checking scheme, we introduce relevant terminology:
Critical Data: A variable or object, which if corrupted by an attacker, could lead to the security of the 
application being compromised. The determination of critical data can be done either automatically (through 
heuristics) or manually (using knowledge of program semantics as done in this paper)
Trusted Instruction: An instruction that influences critical data directly or indirectly through dependencies, as 
detennined by static analysis. All the instructions in the backward program slice of the critical data are 
considered trusted instructions.
Trusted Data: A variable or object that influences the value of critical data (through a trusted instruction).
4.2 Level 1 Check: Trustedness
The objective of the Level 1 check is to separate the critical or trusted data from the non-critical or un-trusted 
data (according to static analysis). In the context o f the information flow signature, Level 1 ensures that 
instructions outside the backward slice o f a critical data item (i.e. un-trusted instructions) do not influence 
instructions inside the signature (i.e. trusted instructions).
The Level 1 check is implemented by maintaining a trusted bit (in hardware) for each register and memory' 
location in the program. The initialization and propagation of the trusted bit is performed by hardware in parallel 
with instruction execution according to the rules described below.
Trust Propagation. Trust is propagated during an instruction's execution according to the rule shown below. 1 
stands for the current instruction and its fields are shown as I.dest, I.pc and l.opl ... opN.
Trused(I.dest) Trusted( 1.operands ) && Trusted(I.pc )
where:
Trusted (I. operands) = Trusted(I.opl) && Trusted(l.op2) .... & Trusted(I. opN)
The destination register or memory location (I.dest) is marked trusted if and only if all the instruction's operands 
(I.opl to I.opN) are marked trusted and the instruction itself {I.pc) is marked trusted. If any one of these 
conditions does not hold, the trustedness of the destination is cleared. The runtime tracking of the trusted bit is 
similar to the tracking of the Taintedness bit in [16], with the difference that the tainted bit is set if ANY of its 
operands are tainted. The details of the hardw are scheme for trusted bit propagation are presented in section 4.4.
Detection: An alarm is raised if a trusted instruction attempts to use an un-trusted data operand OR if an attempt 
is made to write to a critical data item through an un-trusted instruction. The first clause protects against 
instmctions that attempt to indirectly influence the critical data, in violation of statically derived source code 
semantics. This is because, under attack-free execution, all operands of a trusted instruction would be marked 
trusted. If an operand to a trusted instruction is un-trusted, it means that the operand was influenced by an un- 
trusted instruction or un-trusted data, and hence should not be allowed to influence the critical data. This protects 
the critical data from indirect modification by untrusted instructions. The second clause protects the critical data 
from direct modification by untrusted instructions.
The detailed exposition of the above rules under various conditions is shown in Table 1.
Destination
(I.pc, I.operands )
Critical Non-Critical
(Trusted, Trusted) Pass to Level 2 Pass to Level 2, set trusted bit of 
target
(Trusted, Un-Trusted) Raise Alarm Raise Alarm
(Un-Trusted, Trusted) Raise Alarm Allow, clear trusted bit of target
(Un-Trusted, Un-Trusted) Raise Alarm Allow, clear trusted bit of target
Table 2: Conditions and corresponding runtime actions for Level 1 check
4.3 Level 2 Check: Verification of Trust
The Level 2 check enforces two invariants: (1) Trusted instructions cannot influence a critical data item to whose 
backward slice they do not belong. (2) Instructions inside a backward slice can only write to critical data items 
that are directly dependent upon them inside the backward slice.
Note that the Level 1 check needs to be performed on all instructions. both trusted and un-trusted. In contrast, 
the Level 2 check is performed only on trusted instructions that pass the Level 1 check. In the current 
implementation (discussed in this paper), the Level 1 check is performed in hardware while the Level 2 check is 
performed in softw are. This allow s the Level 1 check to be performed very efficiently for the vast majority of the 
program's instructions, while the slower Level 2 check needs to be performed only for relatively few7 instructions.
Data Structures: In order to facilitate the Level 2 check, two tables are maintained by the runtime system.
• Data Address Range Table (DART), which maps virtual memory addresses to the corresponding variable or 
memory object identified by the compiler. The mechanism for keeping track of the address ranges of various 
types of memory7 objects is described below.
• Instruction to Allowed Data Table (IADT). which maps each trusted instruction to the data that are the 
allow ed targets of the instruction as determined by the compiler. This table is initialized at compile-time and 
remains unchanged during program execution.
Level 2 Checking Mechanism:
1) Upon execution of a trusted instruction, the checking mechanism retrieves both the address of the instruction 
(stored in the program counter) and the destination address to which the instruction is attempting to w rite.
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2) The destination address is used to index the DART to determine which variable or object the runtime 
instruction is actually attempting to modify.
3) The program counter is used to index the 1ADT to determine which objects or variables the current 
instruction is allowed to modify.
4) The data items identified in steps 2 and 3 are compared with each other to ensure the destination of the 
instruction is within in its allowed-write set. If this is not the case, an alarm is raised and the program is 
halted (the write is not allowed to complete, thereby preserving the memory’ state before the write).
Runtime Mapping of Data. In order to determine the memory object or variable for a given virtual address, the 
mntime mechanism must have the ability to map virtual addresses to the corresponding symbolic name used by 
the compiler. This information is maintained in the DART depending on the type of object as follows:
• Global Variables, Static Variables or Constants: These variables are statically allocated at compile time and 
hence their addresses are known and can be stored in the DART at program load-time.
• Local or Stack Variables: The exact address of these variables is not known statically or at program load-time, 
but can be represented statically as an offset on the stack with respect to the base pointer of the current 
function. These are also stored into the DART at program load-time.
• Dynamically allocated Heap Objects: The address mappings of these objects are not known statically, but are 
determined at mntime by intercepting calls to the memory allocator. This requires instrumentation of malloc 
and free library calls, in order to store the address returned by the malloc into the DART.
Protection of Data Structures: In order to ensure that the attacker cannot overwrite the data structures used in 
the scheme, the DART can be protected either by using the operating system's page-level access controls, or by 
applying the technique to itself with the DART marked as critical data.
4.4 Hardware Implementation
The technique is implemented using a combination of hardware and software. The hardware implementation 
requires the addition of a special CHK instruction to the instruction set of the processor, but no other direct 
modifications to the pipeline. The processor's caches are not modified. Instead a content addressable memory 
(CAM) outside of the processor's pipeline is used to store information about the trusted and critical bit of 
instructions and data. The Level 1 check is implemented in hardware, which guarantees the check has a low 
performance overhead and that it is performed on every executed instruction. The Level 2 check described in 
Section 4.3 is implemented in software since it is only executed on trusted instructions, which consist of a small 
subset of the total program as noted in section 3.2. We describe the hardware implementation in this section.
A prototype is implemented in Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) hardware within the Gaisler Research 
Leon 3 open-source VHDL processor [20], The hardware module which implements Level 1 checks snoops 
required signals from the Leon 3 processor pipeline through a generic interface to the pipeline. These signals 
include: 1) register file control, 2) current instruction and its pointer, 3) pipeline stall, flush, and 4) cache control. 
Signals are used directly from the processor's pipeline without modifications. The checking module is shown in 
Figure 1. It contains a pipelined structure similar to the main processor's pipeline that is used to compute the 
tmsted bits assigned to each data item in the program. Signals read from the processor pipeline are used to 
control this checking pipeline. Outputs from the checking module trigger an interrupt within the processor, 
allowing software to handle Level 2 checks and security violations.
Table 3: CDTI - Critical and Trusted Bit StorageIFS Checking Module
Trusted/Critical Bit Propagation
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0x000012c0 1 0
0x00041400 0 1
0x00041404 0 0
Initialization and System Assumptions: High-level communication used to initialize the checking module with 
the trustedness bits and the critical bits occurs through CHK instructions. The information is loaded from an 
instrumented program at load time by using these CHK instruction -  recall that the program load path is trusted, 
as described in Section 1.1. CHK instructions are interpreted as no-operations by the main processor, and thus to 
be used only by the checking module as it snoops on signals from the main processor. In this current 
implementation, we assume that only one program utilizes the technique at a given time. Future work will focus 
on extending the hardware mechanism to allow multiple applications to use the technique simultaneously. 
Although the implementation of the checking module is specific to the Leon 3 processor, it is possible to 
implement the technique for other single-issue processors as long as the pipeline signals mentioned above are 
available. Future work will examine requirements to implement the technique on superscalar processors.
Storage of Criticality and Trustedness Information: A CAM embedded within the checking module is used to 
hold the addresses of trusted and critical data and trusted instructions in the program. It is referred to as the 
CDTI, for Critical Data/Trusted Instruction. Likewise, a register file within the module contains single bit 
registers which indicate whether the corresponding registers of the main processor hold critical data.
The use of the CDTI to store the trusted and critical bits obviates the need to use system RAM to mark every 
address's criticality and trustedness. This technique also relieves the need to add an extra bit to the main bus 
width within the main processor, or tag caches with extra information. Such approaches, which have been used 
in [21] and [22] for different processor-level security enhancements, require significant effort to modify and re­
validate the design of the processor and call for changing architectural characteristics, such as bus widths, of 
current systems.
The stmcture of the CDTI is shown in Table 3. The first column contains the addressees of variables and 
instmctions marked trusted. The second column signifies the corresponding entry is an instruction, rather than a 
variable. The third column shows if the corresponding entry is for critical data.
Operation: The operation of the checking module in Figure 1 is as follows:
• During program initialization, CHK instructions read from the main processor pipeline enter the CHK 
handler within the module and are used to initialize the CDTI.
• During mntime, the fetch stage looks up each instmction's trustedness within the CDTI based on the program 
counter value read from the main processor pipeline.
• Trusted instmctions have their operands looked up in the register stage of the module.
• The store check stage of module enforces Level 1 checking rules for store instmctions, before they enter the 
memory stage of the processor, (e.g. if a tmsted store instmction uses non-critical operands, the checking 
module raises an alarm before the memory operation occurs)
• CDTI access looks up the tmsted and critical bit variable information in the CDTI using cache control signals 
from the processor.
• In the check stage, tmsted instmction operands are checked and the destination of untmsted instmctions is 
checked and actions are taken as shown in Table 2.
• In the writeback stage, tmsted bit information is propagated back to the register file.
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4.5 Formal Model
We have built a formal model of the IFS technique and use the model to prove that the integrity of critical data is 
ensured by the technique when the program experiences memory corruption attacks. Given a sequence o f 
instructions and the critical data that needs to be protected, we show that the system never enters a compromised 
state (where a compromised state is defined as one in which the critical data is allowed to be influenced by an 
untrusted instruction). Attacks are represented as the modification of the destination of an instruction in a given 
instruction sequence to a different object (or variable) than the one specified by program semantics.
The system model is similar to the Bell and LaPadula model [26], The model and proof are presented in 
Appendix B. The following assumptions are made in the proof:
1) An attack does not change one valid control path into another valid control path. We do not consider 
control-flow attacks as described in the threat model (Section 1.1).
2) Instructions cannot be modified during execution. This can be enforced through page-level protection since 
we do not consider self-modifying programs.
3) Each instruction in the backward slice o f a critical variable writes to a single object. In some programs, this 
can be accomplished by the compiler through selective inlining and partial loop unrolling if necessary in the 
backward slice. Figure 2 below shows why this assumption is necessary for the proof and how programs 
that violate this assumption are handled.
4) The compiler knows statically which object each instruction in the backward slice o f a critical variable is 
allowed to write to according to source-code semantics.
It is important to note that these assumptions are restrictive in order to model the technique for all possible 
attacks. For example, the IFS scheme provides protection for certain programs even i f  they violate assumptions 
3 or 4. For other programs, such as those that contain address calculations based on user input (as shown in 
Figure 2), a compiler warning is generated with the location of the vulnerability.
void chrcpy(char *dst, char*src) {
*dst = *src;
}
main() { 
char bufA[10]; 
char bufB[10]; //Critical 
int Aindex;
input Aindex;
chrcpy(&bufA[Aindex], &bufA[0]); 
chrcpy(&bufB[1] , &bufB[0]);
}
Figure 2: Example of a program that violates assumption 3
Figure 2 shows an example program for which assumption 3 would be violated. In the program, the chrcpy 
function copies the character pointed to by the second argument to the memory pointed to by the first argument. 
Suppose that the programmer has determined that bufB is critical. Since both bufA and bufB are used as inputs to 
the chrcpy function, the set of valid destination objects of the *dst = *src instruction includes both bufA and 
bufB. By supplying a value of 10-19 for Aindex, an attacker can cause the chrcpy function to write to bufB when 
it should be writing to bufA (during the first call to chrcpy). The Level2 check cannot detect this attack since 
both bufA and bufB are valid destination objects of the *dst = *src instruction. This attack can be prevented by 
inlining the chrcpy function such that one copy of the *dst = *src instruction writes only to bufA and the second 
*dst = *src instruction writes only to bufB (and thereby satisfying assumption 3).
Notice that in the example above the attacker has a valid path through which he/she can influence the value of a 
pointer (through the Aindex offset), and thereby determine to which the data object it writes. It is important to
9
note that these attacks would not be possible if the program did not contain a valid path through which user data 
can influence a pointer address.
5. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: SSH Example
The authentication function in the OpenSSH server program [27] is used to demonstrate the two-level checking 
scheme described in Section 4. This is one of the three applications used to demonstrate the information flow 
signature technique in Section 6. Due to space constraints, the other two applications, namely WuFTP [28] and 
NullHTTPd [29] considered in section 6 are not described at this level of detail.
Figure 3 shows a code snippet from the SSH server program that is used to authenticate a user based on the user 
supplied login and password. In this case, the encrypted_password variable is the password entered by the user 
and the pw_passwd variable is the encrypted password that the system reads from the password file. The goal is 
to protect the return value of the function, the authenticated variable, which we mark as critical, as an attacker 
can illegally authenticate themselves by overwriting the authenticated variable, 
int sys auth passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) {
1: struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; char *encrypted_password:
* Just use the supplied take password if  authctxt is invalid *
2: char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw): pw->pw_passwd;
/* Check for users with no password. */
3: if  (strcmp(pw_password. "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0) return (1);
* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. *.
4: encrypted jiassword = xcrypt(password, (p\v_password[0] && pw_password[l]) ? pwpassword : xx");
* Authentication is accepted if encrypted passwords match *
5: int authenticated = (strcmp(encrypted_password, pw password) == 0);
6: return authenticated: /*Critical Data*/
J _________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3: Example code fragment from SSH showing how the runtime checks protect the critical data
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Figure 4: Static Dependence Graph corresponding to the SSH example code
For simplicity, the statements within the function body are annotated with integer labels that correspond to 
instructions in the slightly simplified version of the compiler-derived static dependence graph for the code shown 
in Figure 3. Table 4 shows the mapping between the trusted instructions and the data-objects/variable that they 
are allowed to modify (based on inter-procedural pointer analysis performed by the compiler). This corresponds 
to the IADT (Instructions to Allowed Data Table) described in Section 4.3.
We show through examples how the technique is able to detect arbitrary’ attacks. regardless o f how the attacker 
attempts to corrupt the critical data. We do not make assumptions about whether there exists a valid input path 
leading to the critical data corruption. The attacks are also indicated in Figure 4.
5.1 Attack 1 : Attacker overwrites pw_passwd variable
Assume that the strcmp statement at Statement 5 has a memory7 error and allows the attacker to overwrite the 
pw passwd variable and influence the results of the comparison (presumably authenticating the attacker with an 
incorrect password). Since instruction 5 is marked trusted, it is checked by the Level 2 check, which will lookup 
instruction 5 in the trusted instruction table (shown in Table 4). According to the table, the only object or variable 
that can be modified by instruction 5 is authenticated. Since the instruction has instead attempted to write to 
pw_passwd, the attack will be detected by the Level 2 check.
5.2 Attack 2 : Attacker changes the pw  pointer variable
Assume the attacker tries to overwrite the value of the pointer to pw, possibly to cause shadow_pw to return a 
hash for which the password is known. The attacker must modify pw from an un-trusted instruction, since all 
trusted instructions in the function are checked by the Level 2 check. However, when the pointer to pw is written 
by an un-trusted instruction, its trusted bit is cleared as per Table 2. Now, when the call to the strcmp function 
(which is a trusted instruction) is executed, it attempts to use the pw password  variable. Since the trusted bit is 
cleared for this variable, an alarm will be raised by the Level 1 check and the attack will be detected.
5.3 Attack 3 : Attacker changes value of authctxt->valid
Since the authctxt->valid variable is used to decide whether to obtain the shadow password, an attacker could 
change the value of authctxt->valid from 0 to 1 and force the system to obtain the shadow password even if an
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invalid username is supplied. This may be used by an attacker to gain access to the system using expired or 
revoked accounts for which the password is known. This attack would not be detected by the IFS scheme since 
modifying the authctxt->valid field makes the program execute a valid (but incorrect) control-path. The reason 
for this vulnerability’ is that the IFS technique does not consider control-data dependencies as part of the 
signature, (see Section 3.3). Adding control-dependences to the signature would provide detection for this attack.
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section describes the experimental evaluation of the performance overheads of information flow checking. 
The technique is evaluated using three open-source server programs, namely OpenSSH, WuFTP and NullHTTPd. 
We first describe the three applications, the hardware evaluation methodology and then the software evaluation 
methodology and results.
6.1 Programs Description
The three programs used to evaluate the technique are described below. For OpenSSH and WuFTP, we created a 
stub version that mirrors the functionality of the original program with respect to the security critical function 
being studied. The original program source lines that are retained in the stub are not modified in any way.
The creation of a stub allows us to focus on the important parts of the application, without losing the critical 
functionality being studied. When constructing the stubs, we used natural program boundaries to determine what 
functions to include in the stub. For example, the SSH stub contains all the functionality of the keyboard- 
interactive authentication mechanism. The stubs are representative of truncating the backward slice of critical 
data in the programs (as described in Section 3.3).
OpenSSH: OpenSSH is a freely available implementation of a Secure Shell (SSH) Server in C [27], We focus on 
the functions that authenticate the user based on the user-supplied password. The original application consists of 
66278 lines of C code and the stub version consists of 224 lines of C code.
We chose the following variables as critical data for the application, as their corruption can result in incorrectly 
authenticating an attacker.
1) authctxt: a pointer to the authentication context, which includes the user entered password.
2) result: the return value of the sysauth_passwd() authentication function, the value of which determines 
whether the user is authenticated.
3) fakepw: a pointer to a dummy authentication context used when the user has entered an invalid username.
4) permit empty_passwd\ a flag which determines if users are allowed to login using empty passwords
WuFTP: This is a freely available open-source implementation of a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server written 
in C [28], We focus on the functions which report the actions of the user to the system log. Maintaining an audit 
trail is a security-critical functionality as an attacker may attempt to cover his/her tracks after an attack. The 
original application consists of about 23534 lines of code and our stub consists of 523 lines of C code.
In WuFTP, the critical data includes:
1) syslog: The data buffer containing the string logged by FTP.
2) checkauth: Indicates whether a user is successfully authenticated in the system .
3) path: Holds the path where a transferred file will be stored by FTP.
NullHTTPd: NullHTTPd is a small and efficient multithreaded HTTP server for both Linux and Windows 
operating systems. For this program, we protect the entire program, rather than extracting a stub version. The 
application consists of 2300 lines of C code.
In NullHTTPd, our aim is to protect the Webserver from memory corruption and spoofing attacks. The critical 
data identified includes:
1) char * file: A pointer to the buffer which holds the webpage which is to be sent to a client.
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2) mime types: Holds the various MIME types that the Webserver can output, and their associated extensions.
6.2 Software Evaluation
The IMPACT compiler [17] is used for static analysis and IMPACT'S Lemnlate tool is used to implement the 
Level 2 checks. Lemulate allows IMPACT to transform a 3-address intermediate representation to a C-code 
representation rather than a program binary. This C-code file can then be instrumented, re-compiled into a 
binary, and executed. The Level 2 checks are implemented in software as a small C runtime library (Section 4.3).
The Level 2 security checks are automatically inserted as calls to the checking library before each trusted 
instruction in the C-code generated by Lemulate. The function calls include the following information as 
arguments: (i) the ID of the instruction (corresponding to the PC which would be used in a hardware 
implementation), (ii) the virtual address of the object the instruction is writing to, and (iii) the size of the object 
the instruction writes to. For static objects, these values correspond either to compile-time constants or to simple 
arithmetic expressions involving the stack pointer. For dynamic objects, the compiler identifies the malloc call 
that creates the object (allocation site), extracts the variable that contains the address and size of the object at the 
allocation site and passes it to the checking library function.
For the applications we studied, the security critical functionality (captured in the stub) was not on the 
performance critical path due to natural modularity and encapsulation in these programs. Therefore, the 
checking overhead was dominated by the Level 1 check in hardware (shown in Section 6.3). Since the 
performance overheads for the Level 2 check are low, we report the number of checked instructions (by Level 2) 
and local/dynamic variable mappings for each application in Table 5. This corresponds to the sizes of the DART 
and IADT structures described in Section 4.3. Note that in the cases of OpenSSH and WuFTP, the number of 
checked instructions is identical for the stub and for the entire program since the stub represents the truncation of 
the backward slice within the full program as mentioned in Section 6.1.
Table 5: Number of instructions that need to be checked in the applications considered
Critical
Data
Total Ins. in 
Program
Total Ins. in 
Stub
Checked
Ins.
Local Variable 
Mappings
Dynamic Object 
Mappings
authctxt 125 84 3
OpenSSH result
42435 500 126 84 3fakepw 4 3 0
flag 16 11 0
auth 7 12 0
WuFTP svslog 23060 810 28 22 0
path 45 29 0
NullHTTPd file 7095 7095 62 31 0
mime 136 56 66
OpenSSH
The total percentage of checked instructions in SSH for all critical variables is less than 1%. The following
observations can be made from the table for the OpenSSH application:
• The authctxt and result variables share the same 125 instructions and 84 local variables. This overlap 
between the dependence trees of these two critical variables is a significant advantage. For example, if the 
authctxt pointer variable is already being checked, the result variable can also be checked by adding a single 
trusted instruction. Hence, the incremental overhead in checking both variables is extremely low.
• Another interesting result is the low number of instructions required for checking the fakepw variable. This 
variable points to a dummy authentication context which SSH hashes to authenticate against in the event that 
the provided username is invalid, or the account is either locked or disabled. If an attacker is able to
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overwrite the hashed value associated with this dummy user with a hash for which he/she knows the 
password, the attacker would be authenticated in the system. Since very' few legitimate instructions use this 
dummy authentication context, it is extremely efficient to check, and arguably prevents an important security 
attack. To the best of our knowledge, such an attack is hitherto undiscovered.
WuFTP
As can be seen from the table, the percentage of checked instructions in FTP is less than 1% of the total 
instructions in the program, even when the total number of checked instructions for all critical variables is 
considered. The reasons for the relatively fewer number of checked instructions in WuFTP are as follows:
The authentication mechanism of FTP is much simpler than the authentication mechanism of SSH. This is 
because FTP does not use encryption or complex handshaking in its authentication. Therefore, there are very few 
instructions in the backward slice of the critical variable auth.
NuIlHTTPd
The percentage of checked instructions for NuIlHTTPd is less than 2% percent for the file and mime variables, 
resulting in low checking overhead. We also considered the protection of the conn variable inside NuIlHTTPd 
which is a pointer to a linked list element containing information about the current connection. However, this 
variable turned out to be a poor choice of critical variable due to its large backward slice containing 1486 
instmction and 975 variables. This is because conn is passed around and used in a large percentage of the 
functions in the program. Therefore, care must be exercised in the choice of critical data, to balance the 
performance degradation with the security provided.
6.3 Hardware Evaluation
The Leon 3 open-source processor has a 7-stage pipeline and has been configured to include a 4-way set 
associative 32-KB data cache and 4-way 8KB instruction cache. The rest of the system on a chip is a DDR 
controller and Ethernet core. The prototype hardware design is synthesized for a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro 30 FPGA 
using Synplify Pro v8.1, with place-and-route procedures completed by Xilinx ISE 8.2.
The minimum size of the CDTI for implementing the Level 1 checks for an application is given by the maximum 
of the sums of the last three columns in Table 5. Of the applications considered, WuFTPd required a CDTI 
consisting of at least 128 entries, while the OpenSSH and NuIlHTTPd applications required a CDTI of at least 
256 entries each.
Performance: The original clock frequency target for the system is 65 MHz. With the checking module with a 
128-entry CDTI added to the processor, the resulting clock frequency is 64.3 MHz. This corresponds to a 
performance overhead of about 1%. A 256-entry CDTI corresponds to a performance overhead of about 10%, 
due to the routing constraints within the FPGA. These constraints would be alleviated in an ASIC design, where 
signal connections are not limited to pre-placed paths as in a FPGA.
Area: The checking module with a 128-entry CDTI increases processor the gate count by 4.4%, or 109,004 gates 
over the Leon 3 processor's original 2,454,472. The 256-entry CDTI yields an increase in the gate count of 
8.6%. This corresponds to less than 850 gates per CDTI entry, which is an extremely small footprint relative to 
over a billion transistors per die produced by modem semiconductor processes.
7. RELATED WORK
Much of the earlier work on preventing memory corruption attacks has targeted specific kinds of attacks. For 
example, techniques such as StackGuard [3] and Libsafe [5] protect specifically against buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities. Similarly, techniques such as Program Shepherding [1] and Control-flow Integrity [6] protect 
against attacks in which the attacker cormpts control data such as function pointers and return addresses. Young 
and McHugh [19] have shown that it is possible for an attacker to overwrite non-control data and take control of 
or change the execution of the application. Chen et al. [2] have shown that such non-control data attacks are
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practical for many real world applications such as FTP and SSH. In contrast, the technique proposed in this paper 
does not target a particular type of attack, but limits the writes to those allowed by the original source code 
semantics, thereby protecting against a wide range of memory corruption attacks.
Another class of techniques, broadly called information flow-based security, enforces an externally specified 
policy on the program [18]. The policy can enforce either the integrity or confidentiality of critical data in the 
system. Techniques for enforcing critical data integrity classify program data as high-security and low-security 
and ensure that low-security data cannot influence high-security data in the program. These techniques require 
the user to provide the classification of a large number of variables by hand. Furthermore, this is a compile-time 
technique and can result in the rejection of valid code although the policy may never be violated at runtime.
A special case of information-flow7 based security is taintedness checking, which marks all externally supplied 
data (through user-input) as low-security and ensures that these cannot influence high-security data in the 
program such as pointers [7] and return addresses [16]. The advantage of these techniques is that the tainted data 
can be determined automatically by the compiler or runtime system. However, taintedness techniques are more 
effective at identifying vulnerabilities than detecting attacks as an application can use tainted data even when it is 
not under attack (for example, when computing an index into an array from user input). Therefore, these 
techniques can have false-positives when used for attack detection.
Address space randomization techniques [8][9][10][11] attempt to obfuscate the details of the underlying 
memory' layout from the attacker rather than detecting and preventing attacks. These techniques incur relatively 
low overhead while preventing most current attacks. It has been argued that randomization may be broken by 
repeated undetected attacks on the system [23], or through program information leaks such as pointers exposed to 
the user. Unlike randomization based protection, the IFS technique does not require the program to be free of 
information leaks, or require that the details of the program layout be obscured from the attacker.
A broad class of techniques for ensuring memory safety of C and C++ programs has been proposed in the 
literature [12][13]. There are three main problems with this class of techniques: (i) In order to maintain 
reasonable performance overheads, these techniques perform various approximations or aggregations, which may 
be manipulated by clever attackers to their advantage. For example, [13] groups together all objects of the same 
size into a single memory pool and does not distinguish among objects in the same pool, (ii) These techniques 
require access to the entire application code and do not provide the same guarantees in the presence of untrusted 
third-party code and libraries (or require annotations written by the programmer) and (iii) Despite the protection 
provided by the techniques, the program may still be open to attacks that can change its control-flow7 and bypass 
the checks. Such attacks may be mounted through the unprotected parts of the application code if any exist.
Data-flow integrity guarantees memory safety in the presence of malicious attacks [3]. The main idea is to 
compute the data flow graph of the program at compile-time and enforce the computed data dependences at 
runtime. The data-flow integrity technique checks every7 load of a memory location to ensure it was written by the 
correct store instruction. However, by the time a memory7 corruption is detected, the data may have already been 
corrupted in memory, and hence the only recovery7 option is to restart the application. The IFS technique on the 
other hand, can detect the attack before the critical data is corrupted. This allows the critical data to be 
checkpointed and the application to be recovered from a safe checkpoint. Further, data-flow7 integrity requires 
that all loads and stores in the program be protected, but the cost of protecting all loads and stores is of the order 
of 45% to 100%. In order to reduce this performance overhead, the authors of [3] propose skipping checks on 
some variables but leave open the question of how to remove checks in a safe and secure manner.
Approaches such as NT-Swift [33] and Samurai [34] protect critical data in applications from memory7 
corruption errors. However, such approaches are limited to accidental corruption of data due to software bugs, 
and do not offer protection from malicious attackers. In particular, Samurai [34] provides probabilistic protection 
to minimize the chances of correlated memory corruptions in the program, but an attacker can break the 
probabilistic protection through targeted attacks.
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Memsherlock [24] is a technique for diagnosing security vulnerabilities based on an attack pattern or input. 
Similar to our technique, they compute the backward slice of specific variables that are likely causes of the 
vulnerability and dynamically track the dependences of these variables. However, the IFS technique differs from 
Memsherlock in the following aspects: (1) IFS is a detection technique rather than a diagnosis technique and 
hence needs to be deployed when the application is run in production settings. (2) The IFS technique does not 
start with an attack input or attack vector and hence needs to distinguish attack inputs from valid, legitimate 
inputs.
8. CONCLUSION
We have shown that Information Flow Signature Checking is a powerful technique, providing detection for a 
broad class of memory corruption attacks. The technique is highly configurable, allowing the user to determine 
the desired level of protection (depth of the signature), as well as which data to protect. A compile-time static 
analysis is employed to extract a backward slice which contains all instructions that directly or indirectly 
influence the security critical program data. The backward slice is then converted to a signature that is enforced 
by two levels of checks performed using a combination of hardware and software during runtime. Any violation 
of the pre-computed signature raises an alarm before the critical data is corrupted. The approach is employed and 
demonstrated in the context of three real server programs, and a prototype hardware implementation is described. 
For the applications considered, the overall performance overhead of runtime checking was found to be less than 
10% and was constant due to hardware implementation. The software checking overhead was found to be 
insignificant considering application execution time as a whole for the majority of critical data identified.
Future work will involve implementing the Level 2 check in hardware and extending the compiler analysis to 
include control-dependences in the backward slice.
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Appendix A: Pointer Analysis Taxonomy
The main factors that decide the precision of a pointer analysis are context-sensitivity, flow-sensitivity, field- 
sensitivity, array-element sensitivity and field-sensitivity. This classification is based on [14].
We consider the effects of each of these analyses on security in the following subsections. Although some of the 
analyses are typically combined together in optimizing compilers, we will consider the effect of each kind of 
analyses independent of the others.
A.l Advantages of a Context Sensitive Analysis
A context-insensitive analysis can create artificial dependencies among program variables that did not exist in the 
original program. This would allow the attacker to fake an artificial dependence and attack the system. Consider 
the following code sample
/* Caller function */ /* Callee function */
void goo() { void foo (int* a, int* b) {
int c = 8, d  = 12; int *p = a;
int e = 15; f =  11; * II p*
foo(&c, &d); II
*
foo(&e, &j); }
}
Function foo initializes the second argument (b) to the value of the first argument (a) through pointer 
manipulation. At the end of the function goo, the value of c is 12 and the value of e is 11. A context-sensitive 
analysis would be able to reason about this correctly.
A context-insensitive analysis, since it does not consider the calling context, would reason that the parameter a 
can take values {c, ej and the parameter b can take values {d, fj. Hence, it would assume that both c and e can 
assume the values of d and f  and conclude that c can be either 12 or 11, which is also the case with e. Thus it has 
created an artificial dependence between c and /  and between e and d.
From the security point of view, this allows the attacker to influence the value of the critical data through the 
artificial dependence. Assume that the variable c was critical in the above program, and could only be assigned 
the value of d (one could imagine d was the computed hash value of the system password, and c is being assigned 
to it). Similarly e is critical and can be assigned only to the value of/  (assume that/has the computed hash of the 
user password, which is stored in e). An attacker could exploit a memory error in the application and copy the 
value o f/to  c (ie. the attacker copies the computed hash of the user password to the variable that should hold the 
hash of the system password, thereby ensuring that the attacker's incorrect password is accepted). This would not 
be detected by the signature as the dependence c^-/is a valid one as determined by a context-insensitive analysis. 
The problem is exacerbated in the case of library functions, which may be called on both critical data and non- 
critical data arguments. This allows the non-critical data to overwrite the critical data.
A.2 Advantages of Flow-Sensitive Analysis
A flow-insensitive analysis does not consider the exact order of statements in a procedure and assumes that any 
statement in the procedure that can write to the memory’ location is allowed to do so regardless of the actual 
control-flow in the procedure. Consider a code sample in which the program updates a variable at a specific 
location depending on whether a certain control-flow path was followed. In the encrypt_password function, the 
password is encry pted with a call to the xcrypt function only if it was a valid one.
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void encrypt _password() { 
i f  (authctxt->valid) {
authctxt->password = xcrypt(user_password); 
return true;
}
return false;
} _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
In the example above, a flow-sensitive analysis would be able to deduce that authctxt->password was modified 
only within the then clause of the if-statement ie. when authctxt->valid is non-zero. However, a flow-insensitive 
analysis would assume that the value of authctxt->password could be modified anywhere within the function. 
Consider the case when an invalid password is supplied by the attacker, and hence authctxt->valid is zero. The 
branch in the if-statement would fall through to code that would presumably not modify authctxt->password. 
However, an attacker could exploit a memory error in this code and make it modify authctxt->pas sword as if the 
password had been considered valid (possibly authenticating themselves). This is because the flow-insensitive 
analysis does not consider control flow in computing the points-to set of an instruction.
A.3 Advantages of Field-Sensitive Analysis
Field-sensitivity allows disambiguation of pointers to individual fields of a struct. This is most useful when some 
fields of a struct are critical but others are not: Also, it may be the case that some members of the struct are 
written in a procedure but other elements are not. Using field-sensitive pointer analysis to derive signatures 
prevents attackers from overwriting fields of a struct by using instructions that write to other fields of the same 
struct. Note that this is less useful when all fields of a struct are critical, as by overwriting one critical field, the 
attacker has already compromised the system.
A.4 Advantages of Array-element Sensitive Analysis
In the case of array-element sensitivity7, the security benefits are not clear. It is unlikely to be the case that some 
elements of an array are critical while others are not. Most times, we are only interested in determining whether a 
pointer can write to an array as a whole (typically a string buffer), so that the instruction that does the write is 
considered in the signature of the array. This would prevent the instruction from overflowing the contents of the 
array and writing to another critical array, but would not prevent the instruction from writing to another element 
of the array than the one for which it was intended. We do not believe this is likely to be a serious security risk.
One case where it may make a difference is if the application was performing allocations from the array, in effect 
treating the array as a memory' pool from which smaller objects may be allocated. In this case, it may become 
necessary7 to track each element of the array individually.
A.5 Advantages of Heap-object Modeling
Typically, pointer analyses treat all objects allocated at the same site in the program as aliased to each other, i.e. 
an instruction that writes to a memory7 object allocated at a certain allocation site in the program, can write to any 
other object allocated at the same site in the program. This has interesting implications for security. There are 
two cases:
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Case 1: Only objects of a certain type (linked list node) are allocated at a call site
void list_insert(int data) { Nodeptr make_new_node() {
Nodeptr ptr = make_new_node(); Nodeptr ptr;
ptr->data = data; ptr = (Nodeptr)malloc( sizeof(Node));
ptr->next = start; return ptr;
} }
In the above example, all objects of the linked list node type are allocated in the function make new node. The 
function list insert calls the make new node function and initializes the data elements for the pointer returned 
from it. Assume that the analysis is context-sensitive and hence can disambiguate one call to make new node 
from another. Since the pointer analysis treats all objects allocated at the same allocation site as identical, it will 
assume that the statement that assigns the value of data to ptr->data can write to any object allocated by the 
malloc call in the make new node function. Hence, the statement would appear in the signature of any linked list 
node's data element. This would be acceptable if all elements of the linked list were considered critical. 
However, if some nodes were critical and some were not, then it is possible for the attacker to mount an attack on 
the critical nodes by overflowing from an instruction that writes to non-critical nodes. Such an attack could be 
prevented by allocating the critical nodes at a different call site, so that the analysis can resolve accesses to these 
nodes uniquely.
Case 2: Objects of different types are allocated at the same call site
void list_insert(int data) { void* make_new_object() {
Nodeptr ptr = make_new_node(); void* ptr;
ptr->data = data; ptr = malloc( sizeof(Node));
ptr->next = start; return ptr;
} }
Consider the same piece of code, but with the modification that all objects in the program, including linked list 
nodes, are allocated in a generic function make new object at the same allocation site. In this case, the pointer 
analysis would assume that any heap object in the program can be aliased to any other heap object (since both 
would be allocated at the same allocation site), and hence an instruction that writes to one heap object can write 
to any other heap object. Thus the instruction that assigns data to ptr->data can potentially write to any heap 
object, and appears in the signature of every heap object. This allows the attacker to corrupt any heap object from 
an instruction that writes to a heap object, be they critical or non-critical. This constitutes a serious security 
loophole.
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Appendix B: Mathematical Model and Proof
This section describes the mathematical model and proof of the IFS security technique. It shows how trustedness 
is propagated, and how the propagation rules that are enforced by the hardware ensure that the system never 
reaches a compromised state.
Assumptions:
1) An attack does not change one valid control path into another valid control path. We do not consider 
control-flow attacks as described in the threat model (Section 1.1).
2) Instructions cannot be modified during execution. This can be enforced through page-level protection since 
we do not consider self-modifying programs.
3) Each instruction in the backward slice o f a critical variable writes to a single object. In some programs, this 
can be accomplished by the compiler through selective inlining and partial loop unrolling if necessary in the 
backward slice. Figure 2 below shows why this assumption is necessary for the proof and how programs 
that violate this assumption are handled).
4) The compiler knows statically which object each instruction in the backward slice o f a critical variable is 
allowed to write to according to source-code semantics.
Given these assumptions, we present a mathematical model of computation and use it to prove that the technique 
protects critical data memory corruption attacks. For the purposes of the model, we give the attacker the ability 
to modify/subvert the destination object of any instruction in the program. We assert that all the common 
memory corruption attacks can be modeled in this way including buffer overflows, format string attacks, and 
heap corruption attacks. For example, in a buffer overflow attack, the attacker causes an instruction to write past 
the instruction's legitimate destination object into a different object.
We first define the set notation used to model the program, and the present an inductive proof showing that as 
long as the rules of the Level 1 and 2 checks are enforced, it is impossible to reach a compromised state. We 
define a compromised state as a state in which data is marked both Critical and Un-Trusted. At an abstract level, 
the Trusted property means that data has not been influenced by a memory corruption error. Therefore, if Critical 
data is marked Un-Trusted it means that the critical data may have been influenced by a memory corruption error, 
and thus represents compromised state.
Category Set Elements Semantics
Primitive
Sets
S se  {Si, S2, , Sn} subjects; Instructions
0 o e { O i,0 2 , ... ,O n} objects; program data and variables in the form of 
symbolic objects output by the compiler
R r e (SxOnxO) requests; Tuple of Instruction to be executed, the source 
objects, and the destination object
Decisions T t e {Trusted, Un-trusted} For instructions, the Trusted classification means the 
instruction is in the backward slice of the critical data.
For data, the Trusted classification means that the data has 
not been influenced by a memory error.
C c e {Critical, Non- 
critical}
The critical classification means that the data was deemed 
critical to the program by the programmer.
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B be(TxTxC) A tuple of: (trustedness of instruction, minimum 
trustedness of source objects/operand, criticality of 
destination)
Decisions J j e {Allowed, Denied} Determines whether the instruction is allowed or denied 
based on the B of the instruction
D de(TxJ) Pair of T: (Trustedness of destination, whether or not 
instruction is allowed to be executed)
States V v e (FxA) classification state; All object's Trusted and Critical State
W w e RxDxV system state ; State of the CPU (Request, Decision, All 
Objects' Trusted and Critical State)
Sequences t t c {0, 1,2, ... } time sequence; one instruction is executed per time unit
Z z eW T state sequence; Corresponds to sequence of states in a 
program
X x e R.T request sequence; Corresponds to sequence of instructions 
in a program
Data
Structures 
maintained 
by technique
F f e B^, f= (fs, fjo, fco) 
where
fTS e 
fpO € 
f r o  e CO
Mapping of Subject, Src Objects, Dest Object-» B
(This represents the information contained in the CDTI of 
the hardware IE which instructions and objects are 
currently marked Trusted and/or Critical)
This is explained in Section 4.4.
M (mij)|T|x|T x q  with 
mi J cD
result matrix; maps F(Trustedness of Subject, Minimum 
trustedness of Src Objects, Criticality of Dest. 
Object)-^Decision
(This corresponds to matrix M shown below, and also 
Table 2 which describes the Level 1 check in section 4.2)
A A = 0^ where A(s) = oD 
for (s, os, oD) = X(n) for 
all n
Access Map of which Subjects have write-access to which 
objects
(This corresponds to Table A shown below, and the Level 
2 check presented in section 4.3)
Note: is defined as all functions from the set (3 to the set a
Matrix M: Maps F (the tuple of Su yject, Src Object, Dest. Object) to a Decision
f Ts ( S )
( f r o ( O s ) ,  f c o ( 0 D) )
Un-Trusted Trusted
(Trusted, Critical) (Un-Trusted, Denied) (Trusted, Allowed)
(Trusted, Non-Critical) (Un-Trusted, Allowed) (Trusted, Allowed)
(Un-Trusted, Critical) (Un-Trusted, Denied) (Un-Trusted, Denied)
(Un-Trusted, Non-Critical) (Un-Trusted, Allowed) (Un-Trusted, Denied)
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Table A: Mapping of which Subjects have write-access to which objects
Subjects Objects
Instri ObjB
Instr2 Objb
Definitions:
Initial State: The initial state is defined as Z(0) = (X(0), D®, (f®, a^)) 
where, = (f^TS> f^TO> f^CO) consisting of:
An Object (Data) is initially marked Critical only when defined critical by the programmer:
f^CO(O) = Critical when O is defined to be critical by the programmer
A Subject (or Instruction) is initially marked Trusted when it is statically determined to either write to critical 
data, or write to data that is marked trusted:
f^TS(S) = Trusted when 3 X(t) = (S*, O ^, O ^ )  for some t = 0, 1, ... | St = S and (fco (^ D ) = 
Critical or f ro i^ D )  = Trusted)
An Object (Data) is initially marked Trusted when that object is marked critical or when there exists a valid 
static instruction that uses the object as an operand and writes to data that is marked either Critical or Trusted:
f^TO(O) = Trusted when 3 X(t) = (S*, O ^, 0*])) for some t = 0, 1, ... | 0*s = O and
(fCOi^D) = Critical or fy o i^ D )= Trusted)
General State: In general, a state is defined as follows: Z(t) = (X(t), D*, (ft, a*)) fort > 0
Compromised State: Given a Z(t), 3o e 0  | = Un-trusted and f^cK 0) = Critical
i.e. There exists an object that is marked both Critical and Un-Trusted at a time step t 
Secure State: A Z(t) for which the compromised state conditions do not hold.
Symbolic version of the algorithm which is enforced by the technique (presented in section ?):
Let Z be a sequence of states where Z(t) = (X(t), D*, (f*, a*)) for t > 0, with (S*, 0*g, 0 ^ )  = X(t) The hardware 
ensures that the following invariants hold in every state:
1. The mappings in Table A, and the trustedness o f the subjects do not change:
a a and f ^ T S 5
I f  the destination object is in the allowed-write set o f the Subject (according to table A), then a decision is 
produced by performing a lookup in matrix M. Otherwise, the decision is set to (Un-Trusted, Denied) :
(II) If at' 1(St) = OlD. Dl = (D1,, D*2) = m[ft"1TS(St), ft' 1c o (° tD))], otherwise d‘ = (Un-
Trusted, Denied)
I f  the lookup results in an Allowed decision. then the instruction is committed and the destination object's 
trustedness is propagated accordingly:
(III) If = Allowed, then = D^,
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I f  the lookup results in a Denied decision, the subject/instruction is not allowed to complete execution (IE commit 
its results), and trustedness is not propagated. (In practice, an alarm is raised))
Theorem: Starting from a state Zq (with f  as de fined previously for some X ), and applying transition rules as 
given by the above algorithm, it is never possible to reach a compromised state Z(t) , where X(t) 4  X'(t) 
for some or all t> 0 such that for (S'*, 0 ’*g, 0'*^) = X’(t), S* = S'* and 0*g = (y*g and O*  ^4 0'*^..
We prove the theorem using mathematical induction on the state sequence Z.
Base Case: Given a secure initial state Z(0), the state Z(l) reached using a single transition step is secure.
Let Z(0) = (X(0), D^, (f^, a^))be a secure state.
1) I f  the destination is non-critical, then it is impossible to reach an insecure state through the execution o f 
this instruction since critical data is not being written to. Thus, the trustedness o f the destination is set 
according to the residts o f matrix M:
Iff°CO<o l D> = Non-Critical, update of Permitted as defined in (III).
2) I f  the destination object is critical and the instruction is trusted then:
If c0 (o 1d ) = Critical and jg  (S*) = Trusted, then
i) The source operands must be trusted, by de finition o f the initial state and either:
f > = Trusted (by definition of f^) and either
(1) The destination object is not in the allow ed-write set o f the instruction according to
Table A (meaning the attacker has subverted the destination object o f the instruction) resulting 
in a Denied decision, or:
a(S*) 4 0 ^ ,  and then D*2 = Denied; the operation is not permitted, or
(2) The destination object is in the allow ed-write set o f the instruction according to Table
A, and thus the operation is permitted.
a(S*) = and an updated of ^ 7 9 ( ^ 0 ) = Trusted is permitted.
3) I f  the destination object is critical and the instruction is un-trusted, then the attacker has subverted the
destination object o f the instruction (since all instructions writing to critical data should be marked Trusted 
according to the initial state f). According to matrix M, this operation is denied regardless o f the 
Trustedness o f source operands.
^ C O ^ d) Critical and yg(S*) = Un-Trusted then D
1
2 = Denied, according to Matrix M.
1 1Thus, there exists no object 0 c O | f 79(0) = Un-trusted and f 99(0) = Critical, and Z(l) is a secure state.
Induction Case: If Z(t-l) is a secure state, then the state Z(t) reached by a single transition step is secure.
1) I f  the destination is non-critical, then it is impossible to reach an insecure state through the execution o f
this instruction since critical data is not being written to. Thus, the trustedness o f the destination is set 
according to the residts o f matrix M :
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If f1 = Non-Critical, update of f*t q ^ D ^  Permitted as defined in (III).
2) I f  the destination object is critical and the instruction is trusted and the source operands are trusted then:
If f* = Critical and f*  ^jg  (S*) = Trusted and f*  ^j q ÎO^) = Trusted, then either
i) The destination object is not in the allowed-write set o f the instruction according to 
Table A (meaning the attacker has subverted the destination object o f the instruction) resulting in a 
Denied decision, or:
a(S*) 4- and then = Denied; the operation is not permitted since is not the expected 
destination object, OR
ii) The destination object is in the allowed-write set o f the instruction according to Table 
A, and thus the operation is permitted.
a(S*) = 0 ^ ,  and f* j o ^ p ) )  = Trusted, since there exists no (Su, 0 Ug, 0 Uq ) = Z(u) for u = 1 , t-1 
where 0 U^  = 0*g and D* j = Un-Trusted.
3) I f  the destination object is critical and the instruction is trusted and at least one operand is un-trusted then 
the operation is denied, since at some previous time, atleast one o f the source operands was written to in a 
way that resulted in an Un-Trusted decision. This means that one o f the source operands was written or 
influenced by an instruction not in its backward slice, and thus could be corrupted:
If f* = Critical and f* (S*) = Trusted and f* ^TQÎO^g) = Un-Trusted, then
D*2 = Denied; the operation is not permitted since there exists a (SU, 0 Ug, 0 Uq ) = Z(u) for u = 1, ..., t-1 
where 0 Uq  = 0*g and D^ = Un-Trusted.
4) I f  the destination object is critical and the instruction is un-trusted, then the attacker has subverted the
destination object o f the instruction (since all instructions writing to critical data shoidd be marked Trusted 
according to the initial state f). According to matrix M, this operation is denied regardless o f the 
Trustedness o f source operands.
f t c q (O^d ) = Critical and yg(S^) = Un-Trusted then D ^  = Denied, according to Matrix M.
Thus, there exists no object o e O | ^ j q Co) = Un-trusted and f*ç q (o) = Critical, and Z(t) is a secure state. 
Both the base and induction cases have been proved. Hence, the result is proved.
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